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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON UNCERTAINTY IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND BARGAINING
BY
OMER FARUK BARIS
July 2012
Committee Chair: Dr. Yongsheng Xu
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of two parts. The theme connecting the two parts is
the role of uncertainty. The first part focuses on the role of uncertainty in
cooperative bargaining and public decision making. I provide an axiomatic
characterization of the normalized utilitarian solution to bargaining problems
involving uncertainty. In addition to three basic axioms that are common in the
bargaining literature, I propose the axiom of weak linearity to characterize the
solution.
In the second part I study uncertainty in non-cooperative games by designing a
principal agent model of public bailouts. The first essay in this part sets up the
model and shows that the moral hazard problem, namely the Samaritan’s dilemma,
exists without an altruistic principal. The second essay in this part builds upon the
previous essay and focuses on the informational elements in a bailout game. Mainly,
I show the existence of a separating equilibrium, where public bailouts serve as a
mechanism to reveal essential information to outsiders and in which the good-type
agents can benefit from rejecting a bailout offer.

xi

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation consists of two parts. In a very broad sense, the theme connecting
both parts is the role of uncertainty in economic decisions.
The first essay (Chapter II) concerns the role of uncertainty in cooperative
bargaining. In this essay, I provide an axiomatic characterization of the normalized
utilitarian solution for convex bargaining problems. Normalized utilitarian solution
maximizes the sum of proportional gains as compared to ideal payoffs. The
literature often refers to the normalized utilitarian solution as the relative utilitarian
solution, since gains are evaluated in proportion to the maximal (ideal) payoffs.
I use four axioms for the characterization of the normalized utilitarian solution:
Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, Invariance to Equivalent Utility Representations and
Weak Linearity. The first three of these axioms are widely used in the bargaining
literature. The fourth axiom, Weak Linearity is introduced in this essay as a weaker
variant of the linearity property, often referred to as the “no timing effect condition”.
Weak Linearity requires that the timing of the agreement be ignored over a
lottery of convex bargaining problems when these problems have the same ideal
point. Unlike the Linearity axiom, the Weak Linearity axiom is compatible with the
property of invariance to equivalent utility representations. The solution, which
satisfies the no timing effect condition, then is ex ante efficient.

1
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The second part of this dissertation studies the role of uncertainty in public
decision making regarding bailouts in two essays. In particular, the moral hazard
problem and the case of signaling in public bailouts are examined.
In the first essay in this part (Chapter III), I analyze public bailouts by taking a
non-cooperative game-theoretic approach and constructing a principal-agent model.
I translate the original the Samaritan’s Dilemma to the case of a non-altruistic
government bailing out private companies. The case is popularly termed as too big
to fail ). The main result in this chapter is that the moral hazard problem is
unavoidable in public bailouts when we relax the assumptions of complete
information and an altruistic principal. When the public bailout process is examined
as a sequential game with uncertainties, the information gap between agents and
the policymaker leads to the moral hazard problem in which an agent exerts less
effort once insulated from the risk of failure through a bailout mechanism.
In the following essay (Chapter IV), I address the informational aspects of
bailout policies as a continuation of Chapter III. In particular, I show that there
exists a separating equilibrium in the bailout game when the game design allows
good agents to reveal their true types by rejecting the bailout offer. The main result
in this essay is the case that, under certain conditions, the bailout mechanism gives
rise to an equilibrium in which the good-type agents separate themselves from the
bad-types by rejecting the bailout offer. This type of efficiency-enhancing signaling
mechanism mitigates and reverses the moral hazard problem in public bailouts. As
a result, the bailout game serves as a signaling mechanism under which efficiency
gains are possible.

Chapter II

TIMING EFFECT IN BARGAINING AND THE NORMALIZED
UTILITARIAN SOLUTION

II.1 Introduction
The axiomatic bargaining literature concerns the implications of several axioms that
describe the desirable properties of a cooperative outcome. The original framework
pioneered by Nash (1950) considers bargaining situations under perfect and
complete information in which individuals are expected utility maximizers as
described by von Neumann-Morgenstern. In search of a cooperative solution, the
main question is clearly related to the issue of fairness. This framework of
cooperative bargaining can be applied to several real life situations: division of
bequests, gifts, household chores, divorce settlements, wage bargaining, arbitration
mechanisms, etc.
This paper addresses the role of uncertainty in bargaining problems.1 The issue
of uncertainty has been studied from several dimensions in the literature. In
general, the players’ risk perception and sensitivity plays a crucial role in bargaining
situations, as individual preferences are assumed to be represented by von-Neumann
Morgenstern utilities.
A common approach is to analyze the behavior of bargaining solutions when the
risk preferences of players are changed. For example, a relatively risk averse player
1

Here, uncertainty and risk are used as synonymously and interchangeably.
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is replaced with a player who is less risk averse. Among others, Kihlstrom et al.
(1980) analyzes the effect of risk aversion on several solution concepts, Riddell
(1981) studies bargaining problems under uncertain states of nature, and Bossert
et al. (1996) examines efficiency under uncertainty and characterizes monotone path
solutions using non-probabilistic decision rules.
With a special emphasis on the timing of the agreement, Myerson (1981)
considers two important properties: linearity and concavity. Linearity is referred to
as the “no timing effect” condition, implying that the bargainers cannot
strategically delay or expedite the bargaining process. Concavity favors earlier (ex
ante) agreements against delayed (ex post) agreements. Another similar axiom is
additivity which concerns simultaneity of different bargaining problems, introduced
by Perles and Maschler (1981) (see also Peters 1986).
In this paper I follow Myerson (1981) and provide a characterization of the
normalized utilitarian solution using a weaker version of linearity property
(described in the next section). The normalized utilitarian solution is obtained by
maximizing the sum of bargainers’ proportional payoffs with respect to the ideal
point. The ideal point (also referred to as the utopia point (Yu 1973)) is the vector
of maximum feasible (and individually rational) payoffs for each bargainer in a
bargaining problem. In this respect, the normalized utilitarian solution uses the
same information as the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solution.
In order to motivate the issue of uncertainty in bargaining and the normalized
utilitarian solution, first consider the implications of different bargaining solutions
to a hypothetical scenario described below:
Example 1. Consider the case of two individuals having lost their way in the
Sahara Desert. They are at different locations looking for a water supply and there
is a fixed supply of water at a different location, which is unknown to both. The
amount of water is fixed at 10 gallons. Further, suppose that Traveler A has a
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container with a capacity of 9 gallons, and Traveler B has a smaller container with a
capacity of only 3 gallons. If Traveler A discovers the water supply first she gets 9
gallons of water from the source; then only one gallon of water will be left for
Traveler B. Conversely, if Traveler B discovers the water supply first, she gets 3
gallons of water, and 7 gallons of water will be left for Traveler A. A bargaining
situation will arise if they simultaneously discover the water supply. Then how are
the travelers going to allocate the water?
The bargaining problem in Example 1 is illustrated in Figure 1.
Traveler B

slope=1

3

7

9

Traveler A

Figure 1: Travelers’ bargaining problem.

Let us consider some common solutions that are offered in the bargaining
literature. These solutions are summarized in Table 1.
A classic egalitarian gives 3 gallons of water to each traveler. Traveler A is not
allowed to get more water under this solution because it would violate the principle
of equal distribution. It is clearly a fair outcome, but it is inefficient to waste (or to
leave) 4 gallons of valuable water in the desert. The problem of inefficiency in
egalitarianism is an issue of concern for most economists. Nevertheless, there is a
room for improvement.

6
Relaxing the rigid classic egalitarian solution, a maximin (Rawlsian) egalitarian
would instead ensure that Traveler A and Traveler B each get at least 3 gallons of
water. The Rawlsian solution allow Traveler A to get more water, but that is not an
improvement as long as Traveler B stays with 3 gallons of water.
On the other hand, a utilitarian proposes a series of solutions in which all of the
water is used, securing efficiency. The utilitarian, however, is indifferent regarding
the distribution of water. Therefore, the continuum of (10 − x, x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3
are all possible utilitarian solutions. Accordingly, the utilitarian is indifferent
between a situation of Traveler A getting 7 gallons of water and Traveler B getting
3 gallons and a situation of Traveler A getting 9 gallons and Traveler B getting only
1 gallon. In Rawlsian and utilitarian solutions the outcome is multi-valued.

Solution
Egalitarian
Rawlsian
Utilitarian
Nash
Kalai-Smordinsky
Normalized utilitarian

Unused capacity
Outcome
(proportional)
(3, 3)
(2/3, 0)
(3 + x, 3), 0 ≤ x ≤ 4
(6 − x/9, 0)
(10 − x, x), 1 ≤ x ≤ 3 (x − 1/9, 3 − x/3)
(7, 3)
(2/9, 0)
(15/2, 15/2)
(1/6, 1/6)
(7, 3)
(2/9, 0)

Table 1: Solutions to travelers’ bargaining problem in Example 1.

The two most common single-valued solutions in the bargaining literature are
the Nash (1950) and the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solutions. The Nash
solution resolves the conflict between the egalitarian and the utilitarian by utilizing
an alternative approach. Accordingly, the product of individual quantities is
maximized, splitting the watter supply as (7, 3). Note that this solution is
consistent with both the Rawlsian and utilitarian solutions.
Another alternative apprach is provided by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975),
which utilizes the proportionality principle. Accordingly, the proportional gains (or
losses) are equalized. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution dissents from the Nash
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solution because at (7, 3) Traveler B’s container is full but Traveler A’s container is
only 7/9 full. Making the proportions equal, a split of (15/2, 5/2) is the outcome
according to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, so that each traveler fills up 5/6 of
their containers and there is no waste of water. I need to note that this solution is
efficient in a weaker sense for bargaining problems with more than two individuals.
As it utilizes the equality of proportions as a principle, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution is also referred to as the relative egalitarian solution in the literature.
The utilitarian counterpart to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is developed as
the normalized utilitarian solution. This solution maximizes the sum of proportional
gains (or equivalently minimizes the sum of proportional losses). Accordingly, the
normalized utilitarian solution is (7, 3), which in this case coincides with the Nash
solution. Although (7, 3) is the common solution of the Rwalsian, utilitarian and
Nash solutions, further complications to the problem in Example 1 point out the
disagreement between these solutions.
Example 2 (Travelers’ bargaining, revisited). Suppose now that Traveler B’s
3-gallon container is replaced with a 2-gallon leaky container and a 1-gallon bottle.
Unfortunately for Traveler B, when the 2-gallon leaky container is filled, water is
spilled and therefore wasted. Hence, Traveler B suffers from low productivity. Note
that the total capacity for Traveler B remains unchanged. Suppose for every one
gallon that is put in Traveler B’s 2-gallon container, exactly one gallon of water is
wasted. In light of the new information, the question is whether the allocation of
water should change.
The new bargaining problem in Example 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 and the
solutions are summarized in Table 2.
Let us consider the changes in the solutions I discussed above. The Egalitarian
solution remains unchanged, ensuring that each traveler gets exactly 3 gallons of
water. To give 3 gallons of water to Traveler B, 2 gallons of water will be wasted

8
Traveler B

slope=1

3

5

9

Traveler A

Figure 2: Travelers’ bargaining problem revisited.

during the transfer and 2 gallons will be left in the desert as unused. The Rawlsian
solution is between (3, 3) and (5, 3) causing a waste of 2 gallons during transfer and
up to 2 gallons may be left unused.
The Utilitarian solution is now (9, 1) so that no water is wasted or left behind.
11 11
The Nash solution is ( , ) maximizing the product of quantities. Again, no
2 4
water is left behind according to Nashs solution, however, 7/4 gallons are wasted
during the transfer.
33 11
, ), so that both travelers fill exactly
5 5
11/15 of their total capacities, respectively. With the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution,
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is (

total waste is 6/5 gallons due to the spills during the transfer to Traveler B’s leaky
container and no water remains unused in the desert.
Finally, the normalized utilitarian solution suggests a split of (5, 3), leaving no
unused water in the well and causing a waste of 2 gallons during the transfer to
Traveler B’s leaky container. The motivation behind the normalized utilitarian
solution concerns the fairness argument as well as the timing issue and the
reasoning is as follows: Consider the original situation that neither Traveler A nor
Traveler B has any containers. Instead, the containers are also in the desert at a

9

Solution
Egalitarian
Rawlsian
Utilitarian
Nash
Kalai-Smordinsky
Normalized utilitarian

Unused capacity
Outcome
(proportional)
(3, 3)
(2/3, 0)
(3 + x, 3), 0 ≤ x ≤ 2
(6 − x/9, 0)
(9, 1)
(0, 2/3)
(11/2, 11/4)
(7/18, 1/12)
(33/5, 11/5)
(4/15, 4/15)
(5, 3)
(4/9, 0)

Table 2: Solutions to travelers’ bargaining problem in Example 2.

location unknown to both travelers. At one location, there is a 9-gallon container,
while at the other location there lies the leaky 2-gallon container and the 1-gallon
bottle. If Traveler A and Traveler B are equally likely to discover each location of
containers, then they should be able to reach a bargaining solution before the
discovery of the containers. Furthermore, the solution should not change regardless
of the timing of the settlement, whether it was reached before or after the discovery
of the containers.
From the fairness perspective, the normalized utilitarian solution argues that the
two individuals in fact share 10 gallons of water equally (5, 5) ex ante; so that all of
the water is allocated. Although 2 gallons of the water will be wasted during the
transfer, the unlucky traveler who discovers the leaky container is not be punished
again because of her misfortune. They will each get 5 gallons from the well, but the
final allocation will be either (5, 3) or (3, 5), depending on who ends up with the
leaky container. Note that the sum of unused capacity is minimized by the
normalized egalitarian solution at 49 .
In this paper, I address the timing effect in convex n-person bargaining problems
(Nash 1950) without requiring interpersonal utility comparisons. I provide an
axiomatic characterization of the normalized utilitarian bargaining solution using
four axioms : Pareto Optimality (PO), Anonymity (AN), Invariance to Equivalent
Utility Representations (INV) and Weak Linearity (WLIN). The first two of these
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axioms (PO and AN) are standard and ubiquitous axioms in axiomatic bargaining.
Axiom INV is also well known in the literature. It simply rules out interpersonal
comparisons of cardinal utilities and it is used by Nash (1950) and Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975), among others, in characterizing their solutions.
The fourth axiom, Axiom WLIN, is a weaker variant of the Linearity (LIN)
axiom and the central contribution of this paper to the literature. As mentioned
above, linearity in the bargaining literature is introduced by Myerson (1981) as the
no timing effect condition: “the timing of the bargaining can be ignored if and only if
the solution is linear.”
The linearity condition as defined in Myerson (1981) is not compatible with scale
invariance axiom. The WLIN axiom I propose in this paper mitigates this
compatibility problem. This is in parallel to the result that the normalized
utilitarian solution does not require interpersonal comparisons of utilities.
The type of restriction (the ideal point restriction) imposed on linearity
condition by WLIN is quite common in the bargaining literature. The following are
some examples of axioms that apply the ideal point restriction to different axioms:2
Restricted monotonicity (Roth 1979, Thomson 1980, 2010) is an application of the
monotonicity axiom to the pairs of bargaining problems that have the same ideal
point. In characterization of the equal-loss solution, Chun (1988) assumes equality
of ideal points. Based on contraction independence axiom, Xu and Yoshihara (2006)
use the same ideal point restriction for the axiom of weak contraction independence,
in characterizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for non-convex bargaining
problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the notation
and definitions. Section 3 discusses the axioms. Section 4 provides the
characterization of the normalized utilitarian solution and checks the independence
2

The formal definitions of these axioms are skipped here and the reader is invited to check the
articles I have cited.
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of the axioms used. Section 5 provides a discussion and concludes. All proofs are
provided in the Appendix.

II.2 Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players with n ≥ 2. Let R be the set of all real
numbers, R+ be the set of all non-negative real numbers and R++ be the set of all
positive numbers. Let Rn (resp. Rn+ and Rn++ ) be the n-fold Cartesian product of R
(resp. R+ and R++ ). For any x, y ∈ Rn+ , I write x > y to mean xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N
and x 6= y, and x  y to mean xi > yi for all i ∈ N.
For any subset S ⊆ Rn+ , S is said to be non-trivial if there exists s ∈ S such that
s  0 and comprehensive if for all s, t ∈ Rn+ , s > t and s ∈ S then t ∈ S. For any
two sets S, T ⊆ Rn+ and for any number λ, I define λS + (1 − λ)T to be the set
λS + (1 − λ)T = {λs + (1 − λ)t|s ∈ S and t ∈ T }. A positive affine transformation
σ on Rn is a mapping Rn → Rn such that, for some α ∈ Rn++ and β ∈ Rn ,
σ(x) = αx + β.
The comprehensive hull of a set S ⊂ Rn+ is the smallest comprehensive set
containing S:
compS = {z ∈ Rn |z ≤ x for some x ∈ S}
The convex-comprehensive hull of a set S ⊂ Rn+ is the smallest convex
comprehensive set containing S:
convS = {λx + (1 − λ)y|x, y ∈ S and λ ∈ [0, 1]}
For any closed set S ⊆ Rn+ , a point s ∈ S is a boundary point of S if every ball
with s as the center intersects both S and its complement. I denote the set of
boundary points of S as B(S). I define a ∈ S as an extreme point of a convex set S,
if for any b, c ∈ S, a = λb + (1 − λ)c if and only if a = b = c.
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A bargaining problem is defined as a pair (S, d) where S ⊆ Rn+ is the feasible set,
d ∈ S is the disagreement point. The disagreement point represents the payoffs to be
received by each player if no agreement is reached. It is assumed that there exists
s ∈ S such that s  d. Throughout the discussion I will assume that the
disagreement point is fixed.
Let Σ be the set of all non-trivial, convex, compact and comprehensive subsets
of Rn+ . A bargaining solution F over Σ assigns a non-empty subset F (S, d) ⊂ S for
every bargaining problem (S, d), S ∈ Σ. Note that, this is different from Nash’s
original definition of a solution, since the bargaining solution may be multi-valued.
Let π be a permutation of N and Π denote the set of all permutations of N . For
all x = (xi )i∈N ∈ Rn+ , let π(x) = (xπ(i) )i∈N . For all S ∈ Σ and any permutation
π ∈ Π, let π(S) = {π(s)|s ∈ S}. For any S ∈ Σ, S is said to be symmetric if
S = π(S) for all π ∈ Π.
For all S ∈ Σ and all i ∈ N , let mi (S, d) = max{si |(s1 , . . . , si , . . . , sn ) ∈ S}.
Therefore, m(S, d) = (mi (S, d))i∈N is the ideal point of the bargaining problem S.
Note that m(S, d)  d for any S ∈ Σ.
Definition 1 (Normalized Utilitarian Solution). A solution F over Σ is the
normalized utilitarian solution F N U if for all S ∈ Σ

F N U (S, d) = {s ∈ S|

X mi − si
i∈N

mi − di

≤

X mi − xi
i∈N

mi − di

for all x ∈ S}.

Note that the above definition uses the minimization of the sum of proportional
losses, which is equivalent to the following standard ‘maximization’ definition of the
normalized utilitarian solution:

F N U (S, d) := {s ∈ S|

X si − di
X xi − d i
≥
for all x ∈ S}
m
m
i − di
i − di
i∈N
i∈N

The following definition generalizes the normalized utilitarian solution:
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Definition 2 (Generalized Normalized Utilitarian Solution). Let µ = (µ1 ,. . .,µn )
∈ Rn+ be a vector. The generalized normalized utilitarian solution FµGN U over Σ is
defined by
FµGN U (S, d) := arg max
s∈S

X
i∈N

µi

s i − di
mi − di

where mi = maxs∈S si for all i ∈ N .

II.3 Axioms
Pareto Optimality (PO) For all S ∈ Σ and for all s ∈ F (S, d), if x > s then
x∈
/ S.
Anonymity (AN) For all S ∈ Σ and for all π ∈ Π, F (π(S), π(d) = π(F (S, d)).
Invariance to Equivalent Utility Representations (INV) For all S ∈ Σ and
for all α ∈ Rn++ and β ∈ Rn , F (αS + β, αd + β) = αF (S, d) + β.
The first two axioms above are standard in the literature. PO ensures that the
gains from cooperation are fully exhausted. AN is a stronger version of Nash’s
symmetry axiom. It states that the solution should not depend on any particular
attributes (e.g. the names) of the bargainers.
The INV axiom requires the bargaining solution to be invariant to equivalent
utility representations and only the utility gains of the bargainers over the
disagreement point is meaningful in determination of the bargaining solution. INV
rules out interpersonal comparisons of utility (1) levels (as required by egalitarian
and maximin solutions), and (2) scales (as required by classic utilitarian solution).
In the literature this axiom is sometimes decomposed into translation invariance (β)
and scale invariance (α).
The next axiom is due to Myerson (1981).
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Linearity (LIN) For any S, T ∈ Σ

F (λS + (1 − λ)T, d) = λF (S, d) + (1 − λ)F (T, d)

for every λ ∈ [0, 1].
LIN states that the timing of the agreement is irrelevant over a bargaining
problem which is obtained through a lottery over two bargaining problems. When
the players face one of the two bargaining problems S and T (with the same
disagreement point) with probability λ and (1 − λ) respectively, the timing of the
agreement should not matter. Myerson (1981) combined LIN axiom with PO to
characterize the (generalized) utilitarian solution. It is also known that LIN is not
compatible with INV (Myerson 1978, Pechersky 2006).3
By weakening the LIN axiom in the following way, it is possible to avoid this
impossibility.
Weak Linearity (WLIN) For any S, T ∈ Σ, if m(S) = m(T ), then

F (λS + (1 − λ)T, d) = λF (S, d) + (1 − λ)F (T, d)

for every λ ∈ [0, 1].
WLIN restricts LIN for the pairs of bargaining problems which have the same
ideal point. That is, the timing effect is irrelevant only if a bargainer expects the
same maximum feasible gain from each of the uncertain bargaining problems (S, d)
and (T, d).
The bargaining problem tomorrow will be S with probability λ and T with
probability (1 − λ). Thus, the solution to the bargaining problem will be F (S) with
3

Perles (1982) establishes a similar impossibility result with a variant of LIN (super-additivity)
for bargaining problems with n ≥ 3.
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probability λ and F (T ) with probability (1 − λ). The bargainers can reach an
agreement today by considering a new bargaining problem λS + (1 − λ)T . WLIN
ensures that bargainers will not gain or lose by either delaying or expediting the
agreement.

II.4 Characterization and Independence of Axioms
The following theorems characterize the generalized normalized utilitarian solution
and the normalized utilitarian solutions respectively. Proofs are provided in the
Appendix.
Theorem 1 (Generalized normalized utilitarian solution). A solution F over Σ is
the generalized normalized utilitarian solution F GN U if and only if it satisfies PO,
INV and WLIN.
Theorem 2 (Normalized utilitarian solution). The only GNU bargaining solution
which satisfies AN is the NU solution F N U .
To check the independence of the axioms, first drop AN. The first theorem
(Theorem 1) characterizes the generalized form of the normalized utilitarian solution
using PO, INV, and WLIN, and demonstrates the independence of AN from PO,
INV and WLIN. Theorem 2 demonstrates that the normalized utilitarian solution is
indeed a special case of the generalized form when µi = µj for all i, j ∈ N .
To check the independence of PO, consider the disagreement point d as a
solution. It is easy to verify that d satisfies AN, INV, and WLIN but not PO.
When INV is dropped, the classic utilitarian solution satisfies PO, AN, and
WLIN, but clearly it is not equivalent to the normalized utilitarian solution F N U .
Finally, when WLIN is dropped, consider the Nash solution. The Nash solution
satisfies AN, PO, and INV, but clearly it is not equivalent to the normalized
utilitarian solution F N U .
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II.5 Discussion
The timing of the agreement becomes important if the bargaining problem is
obtained from a lottery of two (or more) bargaining problems. My characterization
in this chapter is built upon Myerson (1981)’s result that the timing effect can be
ignored only if the bargaining solution is linear. The linearity axiom is thus called
the no timing effect condition. Together with Pareto Optimality, linearity implies
that the bargaining solution is the generalized utilitarian solution (Myerson 1981).
The incompatibility of the linearity axiom with the property of invariance to
equivalent utility representations (INV) is to be expected since the utilitarian
solution implicitly assumes interpersonal comparisons of utility (see also Myerson
1978, Pechersky 2006).
To overcome the incompatibility between linearity and the property of invariance
to equivalent utility representations, I use a weaker version of the linearity axiom.
As discussed in the text weak linearity axiom weakens the linearity axiom in such a
way that interpersonal comparisons of utilities are not required but the timing effect
is still critical. This axiom restricts attention to the specific bargaining problems
which have the same ideal point. The linearity axiom imposes a linearity condition
over a lottery of bargaining problems, which can be chosen arbitrarily. In contrast,
the weak linearity axiom requires the “no timing effect” condition to hold only if
these problems agree on the same ideal point. When two or more bargaining
problems agree on the same ideal point, a bargainer will expect the same maximum
payoff from each of these problems.
The contrast between the linearity and weak linearity axioms is akin to the ideal
point restriction applied by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) to the monotonicity
axiom. In this respect, for bargaining problems with uncertainty, the contrast
between the normalized utilitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions can be seen as
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an extension of the well-known trade-off between efficiency and equality. The former
is ex ante efficient while the latter is only ex post efficient (in addition to being
egalitarian). The individual monotonicity axiom (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975)
imposes ideal point restriction on strong monotonicity, and the normalization of
individual payoffs with respect to the ideal point takes the egalitarian solution to
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Similarly, by the ideal point restriction on the
linearity axiom, the normalization of individual payoffs with respect to the ideal
point takes the utilitarian solution to the normalized utilitarian solution.
In connection with the impartial observer theorem of Harsanyi (1953), the ideal
point restriction imposed by the weak linearity axiom on bargaining problems also
relates to the impartiality restrictions discussed by Karni (1998). Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism defines impartiality by assigning equal weights to individual utilities.
However, as Karni (1998) argues, the equality of weights is not meaningful when
individual utilities can be manipulated by positive affine transformations. By
assigning probabilities to different bargaining problems, linearity implicitly imposes
comparability between such bargaining problems. This is problematic since these
comparisons are not meaningful when each bargaining problem can be manipulated
by rescaling. However, I will argue that these comparisons are meaningful only
between bargaining problems that have the same ideal point, as required by the
weak linearity axiom. Each individual’s payoff is compared intra-personally between
different bargaining problems.4 Intra-personal comparisons of individual utilities are
meaningful in expected utility theory while interpersonal comparisons are not
allowed.
Suppose two bargainers have “something” over which they bargain but they do
not get anything if they fail to reach an agreement.5 The two obvious allocations are
(i) all to first player (ii) all to the second player; hence the ideal point is a function
4
5

Note that the payoffs are not compared interpersonally, so the INV axiom is not violated.
I would like to thank Uzi Segal for providing this example.

18
of the “something”. Now, it is possible to identify games as different allocation rules
or mechanisms: all will have the same ideal point since all have the option of giving
everything to one player, but will have different bargaining sets. There is a fixed
“something” they bargain and naturally, linearity applies only to such sets.
As a result of the weak linearity axiom, the normalized utilitarian solution is ex
ante efficient for convex bargaining problems involving uncertainty. The Nash and
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions fail to satisfy this property even for two person
bargaining problems.
To illustrate ex ante efficiency, consider the two-person bargaining problem S in
Figure 3, where a, b, and c denote the outcomes reached by Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, the Nash solution, and the normalized utilitarian solution, respectively.
mj

m(S)

a
b
c

S

d

mi

Figure 3: Three bargaining solutions to S: a-Kalai Smorodinsky solution, b-the Nash solution, c-the normalized utilitarian solution.

Recall that all of the three solutions satisfy the three main axioms of Pareto
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1

S0

1

c0

b0

a = a0 = a∗

b∗

c∗

A = 12 S + 12 S 0
b

c

S

0

1
Figure 4: Ex ante efficiency.

optimality, symmetry, and invariance to equivalent utility representations. Suppose
also that the bargaining problem (the shape of S) is known today, but the
bargainers are uncertain about their roles (on which axis they will be represented)
tomorrow. With probability λ, Player A will be located on the horizontal axis,
Player B will be on the vertical axis, and with probability (1 − λ) vice versa. The
players can wait until tomorrow so that the uncertainty will be resolved, or they
may use the available information in order to reach an agreement today.
Let S 0 be the symmetric counterpart of S along the 45◦ line. Then, the expected
1
bargaining problem will be λS + (1 − λ)S 0 . This is shown in Figure 4 with λ = .
2
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Let the three solutions corresponding to S 0 are defined similarly as a0 , b0 , and c0
respectively and let the players agree to bargain over the expected bargaining
problem λS + (1 − λ)S 0 . In that case the expected outcomes under
Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions, are b∗ = λb + (1 − λ)b0 and
a∗ = λa + (1 − λ)a0 , respectively. The expected outcome under the normalized
utilitarian solution is c∗ = λc + (1 − λ)c0 . Note that c∗ > b∗ > a∗ = a indicate that
c∗ is ex ante efficient (PO over the expected bargaining problem λS + (1 − λ)S 0 ) but
a∗ and b∗ are not ex ante efficient. In parallel to Pivato (2009), the long-term
expected utility is maximized only through the normalized utilitarian solution over
a random sequence of future bargaining problems.
To my knowledge, Cao (1982) is the first in the literature to introduce the
normalized utilitarian solution (defined as the modified Thomson solution). As
mentioned earlier, this solution is also referred to as the relative utilitarian solutionin
the social choice literature. However, as Segal (2000) points out, this solution is not
utilitarian in nature. The sort of interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility, which
are fundamental to classical utilitarianism, are ruled out in this solution. However, I
follow the existing literature in this paper and use the term normalized utilitarian
solution (Miyagawa 2002, Thomson 2010) in reference to this solution (Dhillon
1998, Dhillon and Mertens 1999, Segal 2000, Sobel 2001, Pivato 2009).
In general, earlier characterizations of the normalized utilitarian solution (Cao
1982, Dhillon 1998, Dhillon and Mertens 1999) are based on a version of the
monotonicity axiom. Segal (2000) introduces the dictatorship indifference axiom,
and a weaker form of the dictatorship indifference axiom is used by Pivato (2009) to
characterize the normalized utilitarian solution (together with the axioms of strong
linearity and Pareto optimality).
The title (Let’s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad ) of Segal (2000) is
somewhat misleading. The dictatorship indifference axiom is interpreted in a way
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that pure dictatorship allocations (i.e. giving everything to a single player) are
“equally undesirable” (Segal 2000, pp. 581). As a matter of fact, the normalized
utilitarian solution does not rule out dictatorship allocations in every case. In a case
that the Pareto frontier of the bargaining problem is parallel to the hyperplane
determined by the dictatorial points, the normalized utilitarian solution is obviously
multi-valued. Furthermore, if this hyperplane is identical to the entire Pareto
frontier, then pure dictatorship solutions are not ruled out.
Consider, for example, a two-person convex bargaining problem given by
S = {x|ax1 + bx2 ≤ 1}. The normalized utilitarian solution for S is the entire
Pareto frontier given by the equation ax1 + bx2 = 1. The pure dictatorial solutions
1
1
( , 0) and (0, ) belong to the set of normalized utilitarian solutions. None of the
a
b
axioms rule out these solutions.
Pivato (2009) uses an approach that is closer to mine in terms of interpretation,
although the axioms and the formal characterization are different.
As a final remark, the risk properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scales
play a crucial role in the normalized utilitarian solution. Once there is some
uncertainty regarding the bargaining problem, the significance of the weak linearity
condition becomes more evident. Using this phenomenon, every bargaining problem
can be thought as a combination of two or more bargaining problems with different
probabilities. In this context, the normalized utilitarian solution provides ex ante
Pareto optimal solutions.
Accordingly, the contrast between the normalized utilitarian and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions is a natural extension of the well-known efficiency and
equality trade-off utilitarianism and egalitarianism. The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, as referred to as the relative egalitarian solution, is weakly Pareto optimal
for bargaining problems with more than two players. After normalization of
individual utilities to [0, 1] scale, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has an egalitarian
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objective: the proportionate losses are equal among individuals. The normalized
utilitarian solution uses the same normalization and it has a utilitarian objective:
the sum of proportionate losses among individuals is minimized.

Chapter III

GOVERNMENT’S DILEMMA IN PUBLIC BAILOUTS

III.1 Introduction
The idea of public bailouts is more than a century old. During a time of bank runs
and financial panic, Sir Walter Bagehot (1873) – when discussing last-resort lending
– advised on rescuing the good banks and letting bad banks go insolvent. Today,
the concept of providing public assistance to troubled agents in the private sector in
times of financial distress has been extended to non-financial firms facing the risk of
bankruptcy during economic downturns and countries whose reserves prove
insufficient.6 Recent events across the globe (e.g. the 2008 recession in the U.S. and
the Euro Zone’s troubles with Greece) have once again demonstrated that bailouts
are still crucial assignments in public policy-making.
From an economic perspective, one can provide different justifications, both in
favor of public bailouts and against them. Arguably the most severe criticism is
prominently described by the Samaritan’s Dilemma (cf. Buchanan 1975), where the
strategic interaction between an agent and an altruistic principal causes moral
hazard: Anticipating financial assistance by the principal when in need, agents
engage in excessively risky behavior. In the words of Bagehot (1873): “Any aid to a
6

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 defines bailouts as “providing assistance, the power
to support an institution through loans or direct federal acquisition of assets, until it could recover
from its distress”.
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present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future good
bank.”7
To discuss further, Buchanan (1975) demonstrates how modern-day welfare
policies lead to a dilemma when they become the rule of conduct. Calling it the
Samaritan’s Dilemma, he provides insights into the inefficiency of the outcome that
arises through a donor’s decision to supply assistance to a recipient in need. The
dilemma occurs whenever a donor and a recipient interact strategically for at least
two periods.8 Acting in the first period, the recipient can potentially manipulate the
donor’s second-period decision. This strategic interaction leads to moral hazard, as
the recipient finds it beneficial to exert less effort (i.e. behave in a more risky way),
in expectation of more assistance. On the other hand, the donor (policymaker), who
cannot control the recipient’s actions, is caught in a trap, the Samaritan’s Dilemma,
due to her altruism and her rational decision-making.
To address this moral hazard problem in public bailouts, I consider a sequential
game that captures the informational gap between agents and a public policymaker.
My model builds upon the Samaritan’s Dilemma problem, but I relax the
underlying assumptions of altruism and complete information. Therefore, it is an
extension to, not of, the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
The most critical assumption in the literature on the Samaritan’s Dilemma is the
altruism of the principal (public policymaker) who engages in a strategic interaction
with an agent. In this paper, I demonstrate that the moral hazard problem does not
vanish, even when the principal is not altruistic, but is instead concerned with the
negative externalities resulting from an agent’s failure. Moreover, I show that this
result holds whether or not the agent’s effort is observable by the principal. In that
sense, my findings apply to all cases of principal-agent problems of financial
7

Naturally, the moral hazard problem is not limited to bailouts, but applies to other types of
assistance, such as charity, donations, debt relief and debt forgiveness, as they also reward and
encourage risky behavior.
8
I provide a brief overview of the original model in the Appendix.
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assistance, where the financing is done by a third party (e.g. taxpayers or other
member nations). When there are multiple agents with interdependent prospects,
the problem aggravates: the absence of bailouts leads to inefficient behavior by each
agent as a Nash equilibrium and its presence leads to the well-known moral hazard
problem. Hence the government’s dilemma.
The efficiency-enhancing solutions proposed in the literature for the Samaritan’s
Dilemma include pre-commitment (Buchanan 1975, Chami 1996, Dijkstra 2002),
in-kind or tied transfers (Bruce and Waldman 1990, 1991, Coate 1995). The
pre-commitment solutions require either strong assumptions on the credibility of
these commitments or a strict enforcement mechanism, which is hard to employ in
practice. In parallel to that, in-kind (as opposed to direct financial) transfers are
not practically feasible for public bailouts. Even for the so-called “Rotten Kid
Theorem” (Becker 1974, 1981, Bergstrom 1989), the savings by the selfish kid are
too low relative to the efficient level, and it is hard to attain the Pareto frontier
(Bruce and Waldman 1990).
At this point, it is necessary to explain why the assumption of a non-altruist
principal for the case of public bailouts is critical. The public bailouts in practice
are not due to the government’s altruism towards the private companies that are
rescued. Instead, these banks and firms are rescued by the government from
bankruptcy in order to avoid collateral damage. The argument in favor of a bailout
is that large institutions cannot be allowed to go bankrupt, as their failure might
put the entire (financial) system in jeopardy (“too big to fail”, see e.g. Stern and
Feldman 2004, Gup 2004). This is particularly true in times of a financial crisis due
to an expected contagion effect when the failure of one institution increases the risk
for all others. The main problem is not the altruism of the principal, but is instead
the negative externalities (e.g. systemic risk), and the expected social cost (e.g.
unemployment) after a firm’s bankruptcy. Combining all these third-party costs
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together, a more appropriate term is the dead-weight costs of failure. Based on a
cost-benefit analysis, a public bailout should be offered when the dead-weight costs
of failure in the economy exceed the resulting inefficiency and moral hazard costs.
I also need to point out that bailouts are often political considerations rather
than economic decisions. In general, the justifications in favor of bailouts and the
benefits thereof are highly speculative. For that reason, I limit the discussion
around the conventional justifications for government intervention that are broadly
agreed on in public economics (cf. Tresch 2002): A public bailout is justified when
(i) there is a market failure,
(ii) the mechanism is efficiency enhancing,
(iii) the mechanism minimizes the moral hazard problem,
(iv) negative externalities linked to the mechanism are minimized.
In this chapter, I identify the market failure (i) and address the moral hazard
problem (iii) stemming from the presence of asymmetric information and risk of
failure that has negative externalities (iv). A special case of efficiency enhancing
solution (ii) is laid out in the next chapter.
An overwhelming majority of the literature on public bailouts focuses on the
financial sector. This is not surprising given the importance and frequency of bank
bailouts and the relative proportion of financial sector firms among bailout
recipients. Most of these studies include some variant of a deposit insurance
mechanism (see e.g. Bryant 1980, Diamond and Dybvig 1983). There is also an
abundance of research on the effects of banking bailouts (see e.g. Boyd et al. 2004,
Bryant 1980, Butkiewicz and Lewis 1991, Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Diamond and
Rajan 2002, Gorton and Huang 2004, Kho et al. 2000, Yaron 2005)
Moreover, there is extensive list of papers searching for an optimal bailout policy
and on the effect of different remedies (cf. Ringbom et al. 2004, Rochet and Vives
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2002, among others). In relevance to my study, I would like to point to Ghatak
et al. (2001), who argue using an overlapping generations model that efforts against
risk are negatively affected by a public assistance program. Shim et al. (2008)
extends the pre-commitment option to a framework of an IMF-type institution with
voluntary coinsurance arrangements between agents. Using a model with stochastic
outside shocks, the author demonstrates that ex ante loan contracts are superior to
ex post loans. However, the credibility of these contracts remains mostly
unanswered. As another approach, Dijkstra (2002) shows that changing the
sequence of events and moves also alters the inefficient outcome in the backward
induction game.
My approach differs fundamentally from these models examining bank bailouts,
as I do not require borrowing and lending, and there is no lender of the last resort.
As a result, the bailout mechanism is not restricted to a deposit insurance institution
or a central bank. This flexibility allows me to extend the analysis to include
non-financial sector bailouts, including country bailouts, which are equally common.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section III.2 introduces my
basic model that captures the bailout dilemma of a non-altruistic principal under
plausible assumptions. In Section III.3, the model is extended to the case of multiple
agents and the presence of systemic risk. Finally, Section III.4 provides a brief
discussion of my findings and concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.

III.2 The Moral Hazard Problem in Bailouts
As mentioned in the previous section, the Samaritan’s Dilemma is a textbook case
of moral hazard arising from the altruism of a principal. However, altruism is not a
requirement for the presence of moral hazard. It can arise even when the principal is
not concerned with the direct costs of bankruptcy. Instead, there are indirect
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(dead-weight) costs associated with an agent’s failure that harm third-party
individuals (citizens) and therefore enter the principal’s welfare function directly.
In my basic model, an agent (firm) and a principal (government) are involved in
a sequential game. The agent faces a risk of failure (e.g. bankruptcy) and the
principal can provide financial assistance to reduce that risk (bailout). Their
utilities are denoted by U for the agent and W for the principal, respectively. The
game follows the sequence of events described below.
1. The agent moves first and chooses a level of effort e > 0, which reduces the
risk of bankruptcy in case of an external shock. Effort is costly and generates
disutility v(e). The specific assumptions on v are described in Assumption 2.
The effort may be thought of as the level of precautionary measures and risk
management activities carried out by a firm, or savings by an individual, or
reserves by a country in the respective cases.
2. Nature rolls its dice, and with probability π, an exogenous shock (financial
crisis) occurs; otherwise the game ends and the agent collects a positive payoff
y > 0.
3. In case of an exogenous shock, the principal transfers b ≥ 0 to the agent
(bailout).
4. The agent fails with probability p(e, b) and survives with probability
1 − p(e, b). The agent receives zero payoff in case of a failure and a strictly
positive payoff of y > 0 otherwise. The agent’s failure causes a social cost of c,
a negative externality, which is borne by the principal.
I make the following assumptions regarding model parameters.
Assumption 1. The agents’ utility function is additive and separable:
U (e) = [1 − πp(e, b)] · u(y) − v(e) with u(0) = 0, u0 > 0 u00 ≤ 0.
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Assumption 2. The cost of effort, v(e), is non-negative, increasing and convex in
e: v(0) = 0, v 0 > 0, v 00 > 0.
Assumption 3. The probability of failure, p, is decreasing and convex in e and also
in b.
(a)

∂ 2p
∂p
< 0 and 2 > 0
∂e
∂e

(b)

∂p
∂ 2p
< 0 and 2 > 0
∂b
∂b

∂ 2p
>0
(c)
∂b∂e
Assumption 3 states that both effort and bailout reduce the probability of failure
but with diminishing marginal rates. It further implies that a bailout has less of an
impact on the probability of default, the higher the level of effort by the agent.
In this model, the principal offers to help the agent because she is concerned
with the well-being of society as a whole (or more precisely, with the well-being of
the third-party individuals) and thus wants to avoid the social costs caused by the
agent’s failure. In this context, the well-being of society is denoted by W .
The expected utility of the agent is given by

U (e) = u(y) − v(e) − π p(e, b) u(y),

(1)

and the agent chooses e to maximize (1). Correspondingly, the principal’s expected
welfare is given by
W (b) = W − π b − π p(e, b) c
and the principal chooses b to maximize (2).

(2)
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III.2.1

Complete Information

I first consider the case where the principal can observe e: The agent chooses effort
e in order to maximize (1), and after observing the agent’s choice of effort, e∗ , the
principal chooses bailout transfer b to maximize (2).
When the agent’s choice of effort is monitored by the principal, Proposition 1
shows that the agent, in expectation of higher transfers, exerts less effort than
without transfer, provided that the social costs of failure are large enough to justify
a bailout. This result identifies the moral hazard problem in parallel to the
Samaritan’s Dilemma. The key difference here is that the result does not require the
principal to be altruistic, and thus it captures the practical bailout motives.
The following lemma states that the more effort the agent exerts, the less
assitance he can expect from the principal.
Lemma 1. When the principal observes the agent’s effort, higher effort chosen by
the agent leads to lower bailout transfers.
Proposition 1. If the principal can observe the agent’s effort, and if b∗ > 0, the
agent exerts effort below the efficient level.

As a parallel result to the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Proposition 1 identifies the
moral hazard implications of public bailouts when the principal is not altruistic but
the failure of the agent has negative externalities.

III.2.2

Incomplete Information

I shall now demonstrate that the result in the previous section extends to the case
of incomplete information. I do this by extending the Samaritan’s Dilemma in a
second direction: by relaxing the assumption of complete information. Specifically,
the principal selects bailout transfer b in order to maximize Equation (2) without
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observing the agent’s choice of e∗ . The following theorem describes the moral
hazard problem of bailouts under incomplete information:
Theorem 3. If the social costs of failure, c, are sufficiently large to justify a bailout
(that is, b∗ > 0), the agent’s optimal effort e∗ is below the efficient level.
Unlike the complete information case, the moral hazard problem is now
conditional when the agent’s effort choice is not observed by the principal. For small
values of social cost c, which is public information, the social cost c is negligible by
the principal, the marginal cost of effort is significantly higher than the marginal
benefit for the agent, the expected bailout money is considerably small b∗ , and there
is no moral hazard. On the other hand, the agent’s first condition requires that the
optimal level of effort e∗∗ under the principal’s pre-commitment policy is chosen
when the marginal cost of the effort v 0 (e ∗ ∗) is equal to the marginal benefits
∂p
− πu(y).
∂e
The strategic considerations by the principal must be so strong (credible) that
the moral hazard problem can be avoided. In theory, the pre-commitment option
de
= 0. In practice, however, especially when c is
works so that b = b̄ and
db
considerably high, the agent can always call the principal’s bluff. For instance, by
knowing that higher employment will harm the government’s popularity, the
management of the bailout firm may dismiss any kind of pre-commitments
announced by the government and therefore choose risky investments and expect to
be rescued in case of a bankruptcy.
The discussion above demonstrates that the moral hazard problem in the
classical Samaritan’s Dilemma is also present under more realistic assumptions in
the context of bailouts: the presence of a bailout mechanism reduces the agent’s
incentives to take precautions independent from whether the principal is altruistic
or concerned with the social costs of the agent’s failure, and whether effort is public
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information or not. The next section extends this analysis to multiple agents and
interdependent failure risk.

III.3 Multiple Agents and Systemic Risk
In this section, the bailout model of Section III.2 is extended to include multiple
agents. While my illustration is with two agents interacting with each other and a
principal, it can be extended to an arbitrary number of agents.
Agents and principal are involved in a bailout game with the sequence of events
as in the single-agent model (cf. Section III.2). I adjust the notation to the new
circumstances by adding subscript i ∈ {1, 2} to the agents’ utilities (ui , vi ) and
payouts (yi ), the probabilities of failure (pi ), bailout transfers (bi ) and social costs
(ci ). Again, Ui and pi are subject to Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. An additional
assumption can be introduced as the principal satisfies the budget constraint

b1 + b2 ≤ B

(3)

for some B > 0 which is exogenously chosen as the upper limit of available funds for
bailouts.
To introduce systemic risk and to capture the agents’ interdependence, let the
probability of an exogenous shock be π = π(e) (where e = (e1 , e2 )) depend on both
agents’ choices of effort. The mapping π : R2+ → [0, 1] is subject to the following
assumptions:
Assumption 4.

(a) π(e1 , e2 ) = 1 when (e1 , e2 ) = 0.

(b)

∂π
< 0 for e  0.
∂ei

(c)

∂ 2π
∂ 2π
>
0
and
> 0 for e  0.
∂e2i
∂ei ∂ej
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Assumption 4 requires that the shock is inevitable if one of the agents (or both)
chooses zero effort. Furthermore, the probability of a shock is decreasing in the
agents’ effort choices provided that each agent exerts a positive level of effort.
Following the two agents’ simultaneous choice of effort levels, if there is am
exogenous shock, the principal transfers the optimal bailout amount to each agent,
before each agent fails with probability pi (ei , bi ). In particular, I assume for
simplicity that the agents’ failure probabilities are independent.

III.3.1

Optimal Effort without Bailouts

First, as a baseline case, I consider the scenario where the principal precommits to a
bailout policy with b1 = b2 = 0. The agents’ expected utilities are then given by

Ui (ei ) = ui (yi ) − π(ei , e−i ) pi (ei , 0) u(yi ) − vi (ei ).

(4)

Without the principal’s involvement in the game, the two agents optimize their own
efforts by taking each other’s best response effort as given. Accordingly, Agent 1
solves
max u1 (y1 ) − v1 (e1 ) − π(e1 , e∗2 ) p1 (e1 , 0) u1 (y1 ).
e1

The first order condition for an interior solution is
∂p1 (e1 , 0)
v10 (e1 )
∂π(e1 , e2 )
p1 (e1 , 0) +
π(e1 , e2 ) = −
.
∂e1
∂e1
u1 (y1 )

(5)

Similarly, the first order condition for Agent 2’s maximization problem is
∂π(e1 , e2 )
∂p2 (e2 , 0)
v 0 (e2 )
p2 (e2 , 0) +
π(e1 , e2 ) = − 2
.
∂e2
∂e2
u2 (y2 )

(6)
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Equations 5 and 6 give us the best agents’ response functions e1 (e2 ) and e2 (e1 ).
Under Assumption 4, one agent’s best response effort is decreasing in the other
agent’s choice of effort. The following proposition establishes this result:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 4,

dei (ej )
< 0.
dej

Let (e∗1 , e∗2 ) be the corresponding equilibrium outcome, that is e∗1 = e1 (e∗2 ) and
e∗2 = e2 (e∗1 ). It follows immediately from Proposition 2 that e∗1 < e1 (0). Similarly, a
cooperative outcome would enforce both agents to pre-commitments, leading to
dei (ej )
= 0, and thus a Pareto improvement compared to (e∗1 , e∗2 ). This result can
dej
be considered as the typical case for under-provision of a public good if one
considers the reduction in the likelihood of a crisis as a public good consumed by
both agents. The main obstacle, however, is the absence of an enforcement
mechanism against cheating by the agents.
From an economic point of view, this may help in rationalizing bailouts in the
same way the provision of public goods by a government is justified; however,
bailouts give rise to the moral hazard problem as described in Proposition 1 and
Theorem 3.

III.3.2

Bailouts under Complete Information

To consider public bailouts with multiple agents, first suppose that the principal can
observe the agents’ levels of effort. By backward induction, the principal’s optimal
transfers bi (ei ) are determined as functions of effort, and subsequently the agents’
maximization problem is solved for the optimal level of effort, assuming a transfer
function bi (ei ).
The principal’s maximization problem is

max W (b1 ) = max W0 − π(e1 , e2 ) [b1 + b2 + p1 (e1 , b1 ) c1 + p2 (e2 , b2 ) c2 ]
b1

b1
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which yields first order conditions
∂pi (ei , bi )
1
=− ,
∂bi
ci

(7)

for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Conversely, Agent i ∈ {1, 2} chooses his level of effort by maximizing

max Ui (ei ) = max ui (yi ) − vi (ei ) − π(ei , e∗−i ) pi (ei , bi (ei )) ui (yi ).
ei

ei

As in Lemma 1, with one step of backward induction, b1 and b2 can be interpreted
as functions of e1 and e2 respectively.
Rewriting Agent i’s expected utility function by updating Equation (4)

EUi (ei ) = ui (yi ) − π(ei , e−i )pi (ei , bi (ei ))u(yi ) − vi (ei )

(8)

The two agents choose their effort levels simultaneously in order to optimize their
expected utilities by taking each other’s best response effort as given. The first
order condition for Agent 1 is
∂π(e1 , e2 )
∂p1 (e1 , b1 (e1 ))
v 0 (e1 )
p1 (e1 , b1 (e1 )) +
π(e1 , e2 ) = − 1
∂e1
∂e1
u1 (y1 )
Agent 2 has a similar first order condition and these conditions give us the best
response functions e1 (e2 ) and e2 (e1 ).

(9)
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Using this information, and by differentiating principal’s first order condition in
(7) totally with respect to e1 and e2 I find:

db1
=
de1

+

∂π de2
∂e2 de1



∂2p

1

∂b21


db2
=
de2

∂π
∂e1

∂π
∂e2

+

∂π de1
∂e1 de2



− πc1



∂ 2 p1
∂b1 ∂e1



∂ 2 p2
∂b2 ∂e2



(10)

πc1
− πc2



(11)

∂ 2 p2
πc2
∂b22

At the same time, using the best response functions e1 (e2 ) and e2 (e1 ) I differentiate
one agent’s first order condition with respect to other agent’s optimal choice of
effort to find
de1
=− 2
de2
p ∂∂eπ2 +
1

2

∂π
∂e1



∂p1
∂e1

π
1 ∂π
p ∂e∂1 ∂e
+ ∂p
∂e1 ∂e2
2

 2
∂ p1 db1
1 db1
+ ∂p
+
π
+
∂b1 de1
∂e1 ∂b1 de1

∂ 2 p1
∂e21



+

∂p1 ∂π
∂e1 ∂e1

+

v 00
u1 (y1 )

Combining the last equation with (10) and solving them recursively, I find that
dbi
dei
< 0 and
< 0 under Assumption 4.
dei
dej
∗∗
Let e∗∗ = (e∗∗
1 , e2 ) be the vector of optimal efforts chosen by both agents.
Comparing it to the outcome e∗ = (e∗1 , e∗2 ) in the previous section, I see that
e∗∗  e∗ . As a result, the presence of a public bailout mechanism further
deteriorates the equilibrium.
Theorem 4. When the agents’ effort levels are observable by the principal and
b = (b1 , b2 ) > 0, both agents show less effort than the efficient level.
Proof of Theorem 4. Follows from the previous discussion.
III.3.3

Bailouts under Incomplete Information

The result in the previous section can be extended to a case with incomplete
information, provided that there exists an imperfect market indicator observed by
the principal. Typically, this type of an aggregate indicator is obtained after
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analyzing aggregate market data, which does not allow the principal to identify each
agent’s choice of effort level separately. For example, when each agent borrows some
amount from the money market, and that borrowing amount is linked to the agent’s
effort level, it is possible to estimate the total borrowing amount by looking at
market data (e.g. money supply, interest rates) although it is not possible to
identify each and every agent’s borrowing. Similarly, when every agent in the
market involves in riskier investments (that is low effort), the market data will
imperfectly reveal the aggregate trend of risk perception, although it is not possible
to identify individual risk levels.
I introduce such an indicator λ = λ(e) to the model, which is observed by the
principal where e = (e1 , e2 ) is the vector of the agents’ choices of effort and
λ : R2+ → [0, 1]. I assume that the mapping λ satisfies the following:
Assumption 5. λ is monotonically increasing in e.
Lemma 2. The probability of a shock is decreasing in agents’ effort choices, hence
dπ
<0
decreasing in λ :
dλ
Proof of Lemma 2. Follows immediately from Assumption 5.
By Lemma 2, the result established in Theorem 4 can be extended to the
incomplete information case where the agents’ efforts are not directly observable by
the principal but an imperfect and aggregate market indicator exists.

III.4 Further Remarks
In my model, first note that the principal has a participation constraint in order to
offer a bailout policy. That is, the principal needs to expect a higher level of welfare
compared to the case of not bailing out the agent. Let the optimal levels of effort be
e∗ (with a bailout) and e∗∗ without a bailout. The participation constraint for the
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principal is

EW (b∗ ) = W − πb∗ − πp(e∗ , b∗ )c > W − πp(e∗∗ , 0)c = EW (0)

simplified to
b∗ < (p(e∗∗ , 0) − p(e∗ , b∗ ))c

(12)

Equation 12 can be interpreted in the following way: If any of the terms on the
right-hand-side of (12) converges to zero, then a bailout is not a socially preferable
action. When the principals transfer of bailout funds to the agent does not yield
any significant effect on the probability of success, i.e. if p(e∗ , b∗ ) = p(e∗∗ , 0), then a
bailout decision is not socially preferable and the agent should not be bailed out.
On the other hand, if the social cost of a bankruptcy is negligible for the principal,
that is c close to zero, then no funds should be transferred to the agent either.
One interpretation of the result being dependent on the value of c is popularly
known as the case of “too big to fail ”. In practice, c is linked to the size of a firm
and there are many ways to measure that size, e.g. the number of employees hired
by the firm. It is possible to argue that the failure of the firm should be prevented
to avoid a substantial increase in unemployment. Consider for example the auto
bailouts in Michigan in 2008. The market share of Michigan-based automobile
manufacturers have been declining for many decades, but they remained as the
main employer of auto-workers in that state. Then, one can argue that, during the
automotive industry crisis of 2008-10, the main factor that motivated the public
bailout of these manufacturers was to avoid bankruptcy and ensuing layoffs.
I would like to point out that this part of discussion on hypothetical values of c
is often political rather than relying on economic reasoning, unless there are
accurate estimations of c. In practice, these estimates are not available and the
exact values of c are more often than not speculative. The assessment relies heavily
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on hypothetical and untestable “what if” scenarios: Once a bailout proposal is put
on the agenda, the costs are always claimed to be “too big”, and a government
intervention through a bailout seems and absolute necessity. This situation can be
confirmed merely by following the narrative of the bailouts, as one will often hear
the words “unprecedented challenges” faced by the private firms and the
government’s objective to “save the economy from another catastrophe like the
Great Depression”. From this perspective, the discussion is fruitful only after
careful estimates on the social cost c. Consider the cases of Lehman Brothers (LB)
and Bear Sterns (BS) are considered, where the former was let fail and the latter
was rescued although there were marginal difference in their respective externality
costs cLB and cBS . Once c is assumed to be sufficiently high so that a bailout is
justified, then the moral hazard result is unavoidable. In the opposite case where c
is sufficiently low and negligible, the moral hazard is not a problem anyway because
there will be no bailouts.

Chapter IV

EFFICIENCY ENHANCING SIGNALING IN BAILOUTS

IV.1 Introduction
Since the 2008 recession, the idea of public bailouts has once again been on the
minds of economists, policymakers, and concerned citizens across Europe and the
U.S. The subject remains widely disputed: Advocates tend to argue that bailouts
could prevent the dead-weight costs of market failure, while opponents point to the
moral hazard problem that arises when agents expect to be bailed out in case of
failure. Rather than taking sides in this debate, I aim to add to the discussion by
exploring the signaling effect of a bailout rejection in this chapter.
I design a sequential bailout game, in which a principal offers the agents financial
assistance to reduce their risk of failure. I show that under certain conditions, the
bailout offer induces a separating equilibrium in which the offer is accepted by the
bad-type agents and rejected by the good-types. The rejection sends a signal of
financial strength and self-confidence to the markets, and thus bailout mechanisms
provide an opportunity for a good-type agent to reveal his type to the markets.
Moreover, this signaling property of bailouts can actually mitigate the moral hazard
problem: By endogenizing the agent’s type (through costly effort), I demonstrate
that the presence of a bailout mechanism may induce some agents to increase their
level of effort (by anticipating and subsequently rejecting the bailout offer).
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The insights from the model are not limited to financial sector bailouts. The
following cases can be considered as typical examples: individuals refusing
assistance out of pride;9 countries rejecting financial support from the IMF,
members of a currency union (e.g. Euro Zone) rejecting assistance in order to avoid
lower demand at the next bond auction and a potential drop in foreign investments,
firms (in financial as well as non-financial sectors) rejecting a government bailout
that would potentially damage their reputation and raise questions about their
future profitability. On the final case, consider the following extract from a
newspaper article reporting on the events during the recent U.S. bank bailout:
“The chief executives of the nine largest banks in the United States
trooped into a gilded conference room at the Treasury Department at 3
p.m. Monday. To their astonishment, they were each handed a one-page
document that said they agreed to sell shares to the government, then
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said they must sign it before
they left. The chairman of Wells Fargo, Richard M. Kovacevich,
protested strongly that, unlike his New York rivals, his bank was not in
trouble because of investments in exotic mortgages, and did not need a
bailout, according to people briefed on the meeting.” (Drama Behind a
Banking Deal, New York Times, Page A1, October 15, 2008.)
At first glance, a bailout offer may be seen from the agent’s perspective as “free
money”, and its rejection counterintuitive. Signaling theory (introduced e.g. Akerlof
1970, Spence 1973, 1974, 1981), however, helps us explain why good-type agents may
engage in seemingly wasteful actions in order to reveal their unobservable quality.
Also the Counter-Signaling theory (cf. Feltovich et al. 2002) extends this standard
implication to the case of a self-confident agent sending a signal by not sending any
9

For instance, you may not want to become a welfare recipient because you worry that others
might think you cannot make it on your own.
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signal. The analysis in this chapter links to both cases. In the context of public
bailouts, the financial assistance provided by a central bank may look like a “free
lunch” for a mediocre bank. Is it worth putting its public image and perception at
risk by accepting the offer and being pooled together with the most risky banks?
In addition to applying a variant of Counter-Signaling theory to public bailouts,
I enhance the model with moral hazard, which has interesting implications.
Intuitively, the moral hazard problem in bailouts stems from agents benefiting from
assistance primarily when they are in bad shape facing a risk of failure, as I have
shown in the previous chapter. With the signaling opportunity in presence, the
bailout mechanism provides a benefit for good-type agents as well, and thus gives
agents additional incentives to become a “good-type”. Hence, moral hazard and
signaling work in opposite directions.
The equilibrium outcome heavily depends on the specifications of the payoffs
(market valuation) and the cost structure in the marketplace. In a
reputation-driven market, for instance, signaling is quite valuable, and agents are
more likely to exert high effort when a bailout mechanism is in place, so that they
can be later distinguished.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the textbook case for the moral hazard
problem is identified with the Samaritan’s Dilemma (cf. Buchanan 1975), which
provides a practical framework for bailout situations. As a reminder,
efficiency-enhancing solutions to the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the literature are
pre-commitment (see e.g. Buchanan 1975, Chami 1996, Dijkstra 2002) and in-kind
or tied transfers (cf. Bruce and Waldman 1990, 1991, Coate 1995). The credibility
of these commitment contracts and their enforceability are questionable, and in-kind
transfers are not practically feasible for the case of public bailouts.
Lagerlof (2004) demonstrates that the moral hazard problem is mitigated when
the assumption of complete information is relaxed in a way that gives the agent’s
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level of savings (effort) a signaling value. My intuition is similar in nature, but I
employ a different model specification and signaling mechanism. For instance, as in
the previous chapter, the principal in my model is not altruistic per se, but
concerned with the externality costs of the agent’s failure. More important, the
agent’s choice of effort remains private information, and only his response to the
bailout offer can serve as a signal.
The common ground, however, is the presence of adverse selection that is
necessary for the signaling to work. When for some agents – but not all – the
appreciation in market value exceeds the bailout funds, a separating equilibrium
arises where the bailout proposal is accepted only by the less financially sound
agents. For them, it is not possible to mimick the good-type agents since rejecting
the bailout is too costly. In my simplified model, the agent’s type is thus truthfully
revealed, and his market value will adjust as a result of investor demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section IV.2 develops the
basic model of adverse selection in bailouts. In Section IV.3 I extend this model to
incorporate the moral hazard problem. Section IV.4 provides the general
comparative static results and discusses policy implications, and Section IV.5
concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.

IV.2 Adverse Selection and Signaling in Bailouts
To address the problem of adverse selection in public bailouts, I design a
principal-agent model with hidden information, where the agent faces a risk of
failure (bankruptcy) and the principal can provide financial assistance (bailout).
The agent subsequently chooses whether to accept or reject the bailout offer.
The agent can be one of two types, θ ∈ Θ = {H, L}, that differ by their
respective failure rates and payoffs. I denote the probability that the agent is of
high type by P r(θ = H) ≡ µ. Specifically, the agent fails with probability pθ (b) if he
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accepts the bailout offer b, and pθ (0) if he declines. Thereby, b ≥ 0 denotes the
bailout amount the principal offers to the agent.
I make the following straightforward assumption.
Assumption 6.
(a) 0 < pH (b) < pL (b) ≤ 1, for any b ≥ 0.
(b) For any given b ≥ 0, p0L (b) < p0H (b) < 0.
(c) p00θ (.) > 0.

Assumption 6 (a) states that given the same financial assistance, the low-type
agent is more likely to fail. Part (b) implies that a larger bailout reduces the risk of
failure further, and that a bailout is more effective for the low-type agent. Finally,
(c) expresses the diminishing marginal value of a bailout: an additional dollar of
help is less effective when the agent has already received a substantial amount.
Assumption 6 immediately implies the following result:
Lemma 3.
1 − pL (b)
1 − pH (b)
<
1 − pH (0)
1 − pL (0)
The immediate and direct costs of bankruptcy are borne by the agent: His
failure yields a payoff of 0, but he receives a positive payout yθφ > 0 otherwise.
Thereby θ is the agent’s true type, and φ ∈ {H, L, M } denotes how the agent is
perceived by the market, with φ = M standing for the market being unable to
distinguish between the two types. The agent’s well-being is given by the expected
utility over his payoff. I require his utility function U (y) to be well-behaved, that is:
Assumption 7.
U (0) = 0, U 0 (.) > 0, and U 00 (.) ≤ 0.
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To simplify notation, I define uθφ ≡ U (yθφ ) for the purpose of my analysis.
Naturally, on the basis of survivability, the high-type agent should be better off than
the low-type agent, under the same market perception. I also require that a more
favorable perception by the market is reflected in the agent’s payoffs. That is:
Assumption 8.
(a) uHφ > uLφ

for any φ, and

(b) uθH > uθM > uθL

for any θ.

The latter restriction reflects that e.g. a firm with good reputation has easier and
cheaper access to borrowing or having more customers and is overall more profitable.
While not being altruistic per se, the principal has to carry the indirect (that is,
social) costs of the agent’s failure, which I denote by c > 0. The principal chooses b
in order to maximize her well-being, which – in the case where only the low-type
agent accepts the offer – is given by

W (b) = W0 − (1 − µ) b − (1 − µ) pL (b) c.

In sum, I propose a bailout game with the following sequence of events:
1. The agent observes its type drawn from Θ. He is of type H with probability µ
and type L with probability 1 − µ.
2. Without observing the agent’s type, the principal offers bailout transfer b.
The bailout transfer lowers the risk of failure as discussed above.
3. The agent decides whether to Accept or Reject the bailout offer.
4. Nature rolls its dice and the payoffs are realized. The agent fails with
probability pθ (b) and survives with probability 1 − pθ (b). If the agent fails, he
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receives a payoff of 0 and causes a social cost equal to c. In case of survival,
there is no social cost, and the agent receives payoff yθφ > 0, with
corresponding utility uθφ .
Since there are two types of agents, each with a choice between two alternatives
(namely whether to Accept or Reject the bailout proposal), there are four potential
equilibrium outcomes: Two pooling equilibria, where either both types Accept or
Reject; and two separating outcomes where one type Accepts the bailout and the
other Rejects it. I define Ψ ∈ {A, R}2 as the two-dimensional response set of a
high-type and a low-type agent to the bailout proposal. For instance, I denote the
case where the high-type Accepts and the low type agent Rejects the bailout with
ψ = (A, R), and so forth. Therefore, a pooling equilibrium requires a response of
(A, A) or (R, R), and the potential separating equilibria entail (A, R) or (R, A). I
now consider each case individually.

IV.2.1

Pooling Equilibria

ψ = (A, A)
In a pooling equilibrium where both types Accept, an agent will have a payoff of
yθM . Conversely, if the agent were to Reject the bailout, the market values him as a
high-type, so that his payoff is yθH .10
For ψ = (A, A) to be an equilibrium outcome, both agents would need to Accept
the bailout offer b∗AA ; and b∗AA must maximize the principal’s welfare function, given
that both types Accept the bailout. When the agent is of high type, θ = H, he
Accepts the bailout proposal b∗AA if and only if
pH (b∗AA ) 0 + (1 − pH (b∗AA )) uHM > pH (0) 0 + (1 − pH (0)) uHH ,
10

This assumption is in line with the findings (see below) that the high-type agent might be able
to signal his type by rejecting the bailout.
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which simplifies to
uHH
1 − pH (b∗AA )
>
.
1 − pH (0)
uHM

(13)

Similarly, a low-type agent Accepts b∗AA if and only if
1 − pL (b∗AA )
uLH
>
.
1 − pL (0)
uLM

(14)

On the other hand, the principal chooses the bailout proposal b = b∗AA so as to
maximize

WAA (b) = µ[W0 − b − pH (b)c] + (1 − µ)[W0 − b − pL (b)c].

This yields the first-order condition
1
µ p0H (b) + (1 − µ) p0L (b)|b=b∗ = − ,
AA
c

(15)

and the following result is obtained.
Proposition 3. There exists a pooling equilibrium where both types Accept the
bailout offer b∗AA given as the solution to Equation (15), if the following conditions
hold:
• b∗AA > 0.
•

1 − pH (b∗AA )
uHH
>
.
1 − pH (0)
uHM

1 − pH (b∗AA )
uLH
•
>
.
1 − pH (0)
uLM
Proof. Follows from the previous discussion.
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ψ = (R, R)
When both types Reject the bailout, the principal’s expected welfare is

WRR (b) = µ[W0 − pH (0) c] + (1 − µ)[W0 − pL (0) c],

(16)

which is independent of b, as expected. Nonetheless, the bailout offer needs to
induce both types to Reject it. I therefore set b∗RR = 0, since this is the weakest
restriction to induce compliance by the agent. Hence no bailout is offered, and the
resulting equilibrium is a trivial one.

IV.2.2

Separating Equilibria

ψ = (A, R)
First consider the separating case (A, R), where the high-type Accepts the bailout
and the low-type Rejects. Clearly, this is not a feasible outcome: the low-type will
be better off by mimicking the high-type by Accepting the bailout, which would not
only reduce his risk, but also increase his market value.

ψ = (R, A)
Lastly, I address the most interesting case where only the low-type agent Accepts
the bailout offer. In the corresponding (separating) equilibrium, the agent will be
valued by the market as a high-type (and get utility uθH ) if he Rejects the bailout,
and as a low-type (with utility uθL ) if he Accepts the proposal. Hence, for a
high-type agent to Reject the bailout offer b∗RA , it is needed
pH (0) 0 + (1 − pH (0)) uHH > pH (b∗RA ) 0 + (1 − pH (b∗RA )) yHL

49
which simplifies to
uHH
1 − pH (b∗RA )
<
.
1 − pH (0)
uHL

(17)

Similarly, a low-type agent Accepts b∗RA if and only if
1 − pL (b∗RA )
uLH
<
.
1 − pL (0)
uLL

(18)

This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 4. It is optimal for a low-type agent to Accept b∗RA and for a high-type
agent to Reject the bailout if and only if Inequalities (17) and (18) are satisfied.
Proof. Follows from the previous discussion.

I now turn to the principal’s optimization problem:
Lemma 5. If ψ = (R, A), the principal’s welfare is maximized at b∗RA given by
1
p0L (b∗RA ) = − .
c

These findings are combined to obtain the conditions for a separating
equilibrium. For simplicity, I summarize the underlying assumptions, before stating
the main theorem of this section.
Assumption 9.
−1

(a) b∗RA = p0L (−1/c) > 0.
(b)

1 − pH (b∗RA )
uHH
<
.
1 − pH (0)
uHL

(c)

uLH
1 − pL (b∗RA )
<
.
uLL
1 − pL (0)
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Theorem 5. (Efficiency Enhancing Signaling)
Under Assumption 9, there exists a separating equilibrium where the low-type
agent Accepts the bailout proposal b∗RA = p0L −1 (−1/c), and the high-type agent
Rejects the offer.

In the present case, the high-type agent takes advantage of the signaling
mechanism. By rejecting the bailout offer, he reveals his type, sending a message
that he does not need any assistance. In contrast, rejecting the bailout offer is too
costly for the low-type agent, and he takes advantage of the bailout assistance in
order to reduce the risk of failure.
In the following section, I enhance the model by endogenizing the agent’s type
through costly effort. I demonstrate in this context that a bailout mechanism may
also cause moral hazard, in parallel to the findings of the previous chapter.
However, I observe that the presence of a bailout offer can also have a positive effect
on the agents’ level of effort, namely by allowing high-type agents to signal their
financial superiority to the market.

IV.3 Bailouts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
I want to explore the effect of the signaling mechanism described in Section IV.2 on
the moral hazard problem that is so common in bailouts. For the signaling
mechanism to work, I require a separating equilibrium, where only the low-type
agent Accepts the principal’s bailout proposal. Focusing on this scenario, I expand
the principal-agent model from Section IV.2 by allowing the agent to select his type
through costly effort.
I describe conditions that shape the agent’s optimal effort choice and compare
those to the optimal effort level without the bailout mechanism. Then it is possible
to identify the conditions under which the existence of a bailout plan gives rise to
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moral hazard. Perhaps more interestingly, it is also possible to describe scenarios
where the signaling opportunity mitigates or even reverses the moral hazard
problem.

IV.3.1

A Separating Equilibrium with Bailouts

I assume a continuum of agents that first choose whether to exert high effort eH > 0
and become a high-type agent or instead choose zero effort to become a low-type
agent. Agents differ (solely) in how costly it is for them to exert high effort, and
τ
their disutility is given by vH
≡ vτ (eH ), where τ denotes the agent’s type in regard

to productivity. For simplicity I also assume that vτ (0) = 0 for all τ . Note that the
agent’s type, θ ∈ Θ = {H, L}, depends solely on his choice of effort. Moreover, as in
the previous section, the agent’s type is the only determinant for his payout, and his
probability of failure.
The remaining steps of the model coincide with the sequential game from
Section IV.2. That is:
1. Each agent decides whether to become a high-type or a low-type by choosing
the respective level of effort. His choice, as well as his productivity-type τ
remain private information.
2. The principal offers bailout transfer b > 0. The bailout reduces the probability
of failure, which is consistent with Assumption 6.
3. The agent Accepts or Rejects the bailout offer. If he Accepts, the market will
view him as a low-type so that he receives a utility of uθL ). Conversely, he will
be considered a high-type agent with utility uθH if he Rejects the bailout offer.
In particular, I require Assumptions 7 and 8 to hold.
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4. Nature rolls its dice and the payoffs are realized. As before, an agent’s failure
results in personal utility 0 and social costs c. If he survives, he gains utility
uθφ , and there are no social costs.
Lemma 4 describes the condition under which an agent Accepts the bailout if he
initially choses low effort and Rejects the bailout after choosing high effort. In this
separating equilibrium, the principal’s optimal bailout offer b∗ is again given by
Lemma 5.
Combining these results essentially characterizes a separating equilibrium, akin
to Section IV.2, for the second part of the game. The novel feature of this section is
the choice of effort that precedes the separation and signaling process and that
specifies an agent as a high-type or as a low-type. The analysis yields the following
result:
Theorem 6. Under Assumption 9, there exists a separating equilibrium under
1
which the principal offers bailout b∗ given by the identity p0L (b∗ ) = − , and where it
c
is optimal for the agent to . . .
(a) . . . choose low effort and Accept the bailout if

τ
vH
> [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL .

(19)

(b) . . . choose high effort and Reject the bailout otherwise.

I now consider the optimal choice of effort when no bailout mechanism is present.
IV.3.2

Optimal Effort without Bailouts

In the absence of a bailout mechanism, an agent has no opportunity to signal his
type and he will be treated as an “average”-type by the market. Similar to Section
IV.2, his utility in case of survival is given by uHM if he exerts high effort, and uLM
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otherwise. In particular, the conditions specified in Assumption 8 hold. Hence,
when exerting low effort, the agent’s expected utility is given by

EUL ≡ pL (0) · 0 + [1 − pL (0)] · uLM ,

and in the case of high effort he receives

τ
.
EUH ≡ pH (0) · 0 + [1 − pH (0)] · uHM − vH

This immediately leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. It is optimal for the agent to exert low effort if and only if

τ
vH
> [1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM .

(20)

Proof. Follows from the previous discussion.

IV.3.3

Effect of Bailout Mechanism on Optimal Effort

To analyze the impact of a bailout mechanism on an agent’s optimal level of effort,
a comparison is needed between Equations (19) and (20). If the agent is inefficient
τ
and effort is extremely costly, vH
is large and both inequalities are satisfied. In that

case, zero effort is optimal both with and without a bailout offer. Conversely, for
efficient agents both inequalities are violated, and the agent exerts high effort in
both cases.
More interestingly, it is also possible for one inequality to be satisfied while the
other is violated. The following two theorems characterize the respective outcomes:
Theorem 7 (Samaritan’s Dilemma, revisited). Under Assumption 9, and if

τ
[1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM > vH
> [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL , (21)
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the introduction of a bailout mechanism reduces the agent’s optimal level of effort.
Theorem 8 (Efficiency-Enhancing Signaling, revisited). Under Assumption 9, and
if

τ
[1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM < vH
< [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL , (22)

the presence of a bailout mechanism increases the agent’s optimal level of effort from
0 to eH .
Theorems 7 and 8 demonstrate that the bailout mechanism can both cause and
reverse moral hazard, depending on market specifications. Provided that
Assumption 9 holds, and if

[1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM > [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL , (23)

the moral hazard problem dominates: medium-efficient agents, for which Inequality
(21) holds, settle for becoming a low-type. However, they would have exerted high
effort if it were not for the bailout mechanism. In addition, the more efficient
τ
agents, for which vH
< [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL , will choose high effort

regardless of the bailout; conversely, the less efficient agents, characterized by
τ
> [1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM , will exert no effort in both cases.
vH

When Inequality 23 is reversed, the signaling opportunity reverses the moral
hazard problem for some agents, namely those that satisfy Inequality (22). Similary
to the previous case, the inefficient agents
τ
(vH
> [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL ) will shirk either way, and the most
τ
efficient agents (vH
< [1 − pH (0)] · uHM − [1 − pL (0)] · uLM ) exert high effort,

regardless of the bailout situation.
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It remains to be shown that it is possible for both scenarios to arise. For that
matter, note that Inequality (23) can be rewritten as

[1 − pH (0)] ·

uHH − uHM
uLM − uLL <
+ [1 − pL (0)] ·
> pL (0) − pL (b∗ ).
uLL
uLL

(24)

Both fractions are positive by Assumption 8. The right-hand side is also positive by
Assumption 6. The sign of this inequality depends on the differences in payoffs
relative to the impact of a bailout: if for instance the payoff levels are rather similar
(that is, if the fractions in Equation (24) are small), or if an agent who chose a low
level of effort and who would consequently benefit significantly from the bailout
(that is, pL (0) − pL (b∗ ) is large), then the conditions for Theorem 7 may be satisfied.
In that case, the anticipation of a bailout leads to moral hazard as the agent reduces
its level of effort.
Conversely, if the return to signaling (uHH − uHM ) is considerable, or if the
optimal bailout amount reduces the failure rate of the agent only slightly (that is if
pL (0) − pL (b∗ ) is small), the right-hand side of Equation (21) exceeds the left-hand
τ
) matches as well, Theorem 8 applies: the agent
side. If the disutility of effort (vH

exerts a high level of effort when anticipating a bailout offer because it intends to
use the offer (by rejecting it) in order to signal its type to the market. In essence,
the bailout mechanism gives the agent an opportunity to signal the market that he
exerted a high level of effort. Without the bailout mechanism, he could not send
this signal and therefore would initially exert less effort.

IV.4 Comparative Statics and Welfare Analysis
It is possible now to evaluate the welfare implications of these results. In this
section, I study how the choice of equilibrium varies as the specific parameters of
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the model change. To do so, I will separately look at the impact of productivity,
payoffs, market characteristics and the social cost.

IV.4.1

Equilibrium Selection

The principal’s concern for the social cost c will be reflected in her choice of the
bailout transfer b∗ . For small values of c, the optimal bailout decision is trivially
b∗ = 0, and the results shown in Section IV.3.2 apply. Thus, from now on, I assume
that c is not negligible to the extent that p0θ −1 (−1/c) > 0.
From an agent’s perspective, the selection of the equilibrium outcome depends
on two crucial parameters: his productivity and his expected payout structure. For
instance, his productivity, that is the costliness of effort (vθτ ), determines both the
choice of effort e and the final decision to Accept or Reject the bailout. Moreover,
the payoff and utility structure of the agent play a crucial role in effort choice and
equilibrium selection.
Starting with the latter, note that it is necessary to distinguish the difference
between the two types of agents (i.e. uHφ − uLφ ) from the impact of market
perception (i.e. uθH − uθL ). More generally, the equilibrium outcome can be affected
by the agent’s risk aversion: Since risk-neutral agents are more prone to failure, an
aversion to risk tends to lower the cost of a bailout in either equilibrium by pushing
the agent towards a higher level of effort.
Another critical factor is the market perception of the agent. As demonstrated
at the end of Section IV.3, if the payoff structure is heavily influenced by outside
opinion, the return to signaling is high, and a separating equilibrium becomes more
likely. Such a situation is more likely to occur in the financial services industry than
for manufacturers’ whose asset values generally exhibit less volatility and can be
determined more accurately.
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Signaling can also be quite valuable for firms that are publicly traded, as they
tend to put more emphasis on their outside image, in addition to their internal
operations and risk management. It further matters how perfectly the respective
market sector relays information: If every piece of public information about the
agent is captured by the stock price, then the possibility of a separating equilibrium
through signaling will be higher as well.
From the conditions of Theorem 8, it is possible to deduce that a separating
equilibrium is more likely if the dispersion in vθτ is high in an economy with a
continuum of agents. This is particularly true when some agents are significantly
more productive than others and thus have cheaper access to precautionary
measures. Since Inequality 19 is immediately violated, it is optimal for a productive
agent to exert high effort. Trivially, this outcome is efficient: neither the principal
nor the agent can be made better off. Conversely, in sectors of the economy where
productivity is widely homogeneous, the margin for a separating equilibrium is very
narrow. An empirical investigation is necessary if one wishes to identify and
contrast the cases of the bailouts in different sectors, but this is beyond the scope of
the current study.

IV.4.2

An Illustration of Bankruptcy Risk

For illustrative purposes, consider the following functional form for the agent’s
bankruptcy risk:
p(b; αθ , βθ ) =

αθ
.
(1 + b)βθ

(25)

which asymptotes to a probability of failure zero with p(0) = α. Here, α ≤ 1 can be
used to constrain agents to a maximum level of risk while βθ > 0 indicates the
relative efficacy of the bailout money on the probability of failure. In this
formulation, one can pick αH for agents with high effort and αL for low (or zero)
effort (with αH < αL ). Although, a similar argument can be made for the values β
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can take, Assumption 6 implies βH = βL ≡ β.11 A graphic illustration of p(·) is
provided in Figure 5.
p(b)
p=1
αL

αH

pL (b)

pH (b)

b
Figure 5: The risk of failure with 1 > αL > αH > 0 and βH = βL .

Lemma 5 specifies an internal solution to the principal’s optimization problem
under a separating equilibrium. When social costs are identical across types (as
assumed), it follows that b∗L > b∗H . That is, if the agent’s type was known by the
principal, a low-type agent should expect a larger bailout offer than a high-type.
See Figure 6 for an illustration.
With the functional form assumption of Equation 25, it follows that
1

b∗ = (αL β c) 1+β − 1
11

According to Assumption 6, βH < βL implies pL (b) < pH (b) for some b > 0, and βH > βL
implies p0L (b) > p0H (b) for some b > 0.
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p(b)
p=1
αL

αH

slope= − 1
c

pL (b)

pH (b)
slope= − 1
c

b∗
H

b∗
L

b

Figure 6: Optimal bailout transfers when social cost c is identical across types.

as the optimal bailout offer to the low-type agent. For an agent to actually choose
low (or zero) effort and subsequently Accept the bailout offer, it is required that

τ
vH



1
.
> uHH (1 − αH ) − uLL 1 −
βc

(26)

Since the right-hand side of (26) is decreasing in c, this condition is more likely to
be satisfied when the social cost of the agent’s failure is substantially large. In other
words: ceteris paribus, an agent whose failure is significantly harmful to society
tends to exert less effort than an agent whose failure is relatively lest critical.
The intuition is that the agent can expect a larger bailout offer (note that b∗ is
also increasing in c), and therefore transferring some of the risk onto the public by
reducing risk-management activities is preferable. If at the same time

τ
vH
< (1 − αH )uHM − (1 − αL )uLM ,

(27)
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then the agent would have exerted high effort were it not for the (rational)
anticipation of a bailout. This is the moral hazard problem that is a common
concern surrounding public bailouts.
Conversely, if the agent’s failure is not that costly to society, so that Inequality
(26) is violated, the agent – anticipating only a small bailout – optimally exerts high
effort. Note that by the separating equilibrium conditions, he still benefits from the
bailout offer, namely by signaling his type through a rejection. More important, if
Inequality 27 is violated as well, the agent would have chosen low effort, had the
bailout mechanism not been in place. This situation captures the
efficiency-enhancing signaling property of public bailouts described in Section IV.3.
Overall, it is observed that the signaling effect is less probable when the agent’s
failure causes tremendous social cost, as the agent is more prone to moral hazard. I
now contrast the two outcomes described in Theorems 7 and 8 in regard to the
principal’s welfare.

IV.4.3

Principal’s Welfare

If effort is extremely costly, so that Inequality (26) is satisfied and Inequality (27) is
violated, the agent will shirk regardless of a bailout proposal. Hence the bailout
makes the principal worse off, since the (low-type) agent will accept it. If, on the
other hand, effort is very cheap and Inequality (26) is violated and Inequality (27) is
satisfied, the agent will exert high effort in either case and reject the bailout, if
offered. Hence, the principal does not gain or lose by proposing a bailout.
To analyze the principal’s well-being in the more interesting cases where
Inequalities (26) and (27) are either both satisfied or both violated, I denote the
principal’s (expected) welfare by WN B under a no-bailout policy and by WM H and
WS in cases where the bailout causes moral hazard and allows for signaling,
respectively. As discussed previously, the latter two outcomes are mutually
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exclusive, and it depends to a certain extent on the social cost of and which of the
two outcomes are possible.
Considering first the case of moral hazard, that is when both inequalities are
satisfied, note that the agent would exert high effort without the bailout, but low
effort otherwise. The principal’s welfare without bailout is thus

WN B = W0 − pH (0) c = W0 − αH c,

while the presence of a bailout yields

∗



∗

WM H = W0 − pL (b ) c − b = W0 −

αL c
ββ

1
 1+β

1

− (αL cβ) 1+β + 1.

1

Substituting b∗ = (αL β c) 1+β − 1 and simplifying

WM H = W0 − 1 − c

1
1+β

1
1+β

αL



1
1
1 1+β
1+β
+β
.
( )
β

The sign of WM B − WN B is ambiguous in general. Note that WN B and WM H are
indirectly dependent on the choice of agent’s effort e since Inequalities (26) and (27)
need to be satisfied and e will determine αL and αH . If e is fixed so that both
inequalities are satisfied, then WM H and the difference WM B − WN B will depend on
the magnitude of the social cost parameter c. First, note that when c = 0,
WN B > WM H trivially. Second, note that both WN B and WM H are decreasing in c.
Furthermore, while WN B is linear with a slope of αH , which is a constant, WM H
is convex in c when β > 0. Therefore, one can deduce that the gap between WN B
and WM H is widening for small values of c, but for larger values of social cost c this
is no longer the case. The parameters α and β are critical, since when WM H > WN B
is the case, the principal may be better off by offering a bailout, even with the moral
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hazard problem. For illustrative purposes, Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate various
cases depending on the exogenous parameters.
W

WM H (β = 1)

WM H (β = 0.8)

WM H (β = 2)
WM H (β = 3)

WM H (β = 0.6)

WN B

c

Figure 7: Principal’s welfare under high risk of failure ; 1 > αL > αH > 0.5. WN B denotes
the expected welfare when the principal commits to a no-bailout policy, WM H denotes the
expected welfare when a bailout policy leads to moral hazard.

Conversely, when Inequalities (26) and (27) are both violated, the presence of a
bailout mechanism introduces a signaling opportunity. The principal’s respective
welfares under no bailout and under a bailout offer with signaling are

WN B = W0 − αL c,

and
WS = W0 − αH c.
Clearly, the principal is better off when offering the bailout (since it induces high
effort and will be rejected). The agent is also better off with the bailout (after all,
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W

WN B

WM H (β = 2)
WM H (β = 1)
WM H (β = 0.6)

WM H (β = 3)

WM H (β = 0.8)

c
Figure 8: Principal’s welfare under low risk of failure ; αL > 0.5 > αH > 0. WN B denotes
the expected welfare when the principal commits to a no-bailout policy, WM H denotes the
expected welfare when a bailout policy leads to moral hazard.

he could simply ignore it). In fact, when Inequalities (26) and (27) are both
violated, the bailout offer b∗ is efficient.

IV.5 Conclusion
Market failures and the presence of social costs serve as the main justifications for
government protection for private firms in case of bankruptcy risks. However, public
bailouts remain controversial since they have unintended consequences. The
asymmetries of information and action (or incentive) lie at the heart of the bailout
question leading to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
From a game-theoretic setup, the principal-agent models help us to analyze
bailout situations in order to guide both policy and practice, although tracing the
full consequences of bailout policies in practice is a difficult task. The model I
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discussed in the chapters III and IV follow the literature on principal-agent models
by encompassing asymmetric information, hidden action and endogenous risk of
failure.
I argue that the bailout offers made by the public policymakers to private agents
create an immediate and costly signaling opportunity for the participants. By
accepting the government protection plan, an agent explicitly or implicitly reveals
critical information about his financial situation, which is private information. The
same logic is used for a financially sound and a self-confident agent who rejects the
bailout offer in expectation for an appreciation in market valuation.

Appendix A

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

A.1 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter II
Proof of Theorem 1. It can be checked that F GN U satisfies PO, INV, and WLIN. I
will show that PO, INV and WLIN imply F = F GN U .
First, by translation invariance, d can always be normalized to the origin (d = 0)
so that a bargaining problem can be denoted simply as S instead of (S, d). Note that
scale invariance is equivalent to the axiom INV, when d is normalized to the origin.
Next, let Σ0 denote the set of n-person bargaining problems with d = (0, . . . , 0)
and m = (1, . . . , 1). By INV, any bargaining problem S ∈ Σ can be represented by a
bargaining problem S 0 ∈ Σ0 . Specifically, for any S ∈ Σ I define

S 0 = {(

si
)i∈N |s ∈ S}
mi

Note that WLIN is equivalent to LIN when restricted to Σ0 .
Then by PO, WLIN, and Theorem 1 of Myerson (1981), there exists a vector
µi
µ ∈ Rn+ such that µF (S 0 ) ≥ µs0 for all s0 ∈ S 0 . By INV and letting µ0 = ( m
), it
i
i (S)
follows that µ0 F (S) = µ( Fm
) ≥ µ0 s = µ( msii ) for all s ∈ S. That is, F over Σ must
i

be generalized normalized utilitarian.

F (S) = arg max
s∈S
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X
i∈N

µi

si
mi
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Another proof of Theorem 1. Rescale any bargaining problem using INV. For any
S ∈ Σ, define T = Φ(S), T k = Φk (T ) as defined previously and for some µ > 0,
P
1
n
i µi = 1 define ∆µ = µ1 T + . . . + µn T .
By PO, the elements of F (∆µ ) must lie on the Pareto frontier of ∆µ and
F (∆µ ) ⊆ B(∆µ ). Then, by the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem (see Rockafellar
1970, Section 11, Corollary 11.6.2), for any δ ∗ ∈ F (∆µ ) there exists a linear function
f that achieves its maximum over ∆µ at δ ∗ . So for some γ  0, f (δ) = γ · δ and
P
δ ∗ ∈ arg max∆ f (δ). The elements of F (∆µ ) maximize the sum i µi ti for all t ∈ T
P
since δi = i µi ti . By WLIN, it must also be true that the elements of F (S)
P
maximizes the sum i µi msii .
Proof of Theorem 2. As in Theorem 1, let S 0 = {( msii )i∈N |s ∈ S}. For any
s∗ ∈ F (S), F is GN U , there exists µ ∈ Rn+ , µ 6= 0 such that
s∗

µ · ( mii )i∈N = maxs0 ∈S 0 (µ · s0 ), for all S ∈ Σ. Then, by AN, µ can be rewritten as
µ = µ̄e for some number µ̄ > 0 with e denoting the vector of ones e = (1, . . . , 1).
s∗

Otherwise, µ · π( mii )i∈N is not maximal for some π ∈ Π.
Then
F (S) = arg max µ̄
s∈S

X si
X si
= arg max
= F N U (S)
s∈S
m
m
i
i
i∈N
i∈N

Another proof of Theorem 2. It is straightforward to check that ∆µ is symmetric
when µi = µj for all i, j ∈ N . By PO, the elements of F (∆µ ) must lie on the Pareto
frontier of ∆µ and F (∆µ ) ⊆ B(∆µ ). Since ∆µ is symmetric, we have δ ∗ ∈ F (∆µ )
when δi∗ = δj∗ for all i, j ∈ N by AN.
If δ ∗ is an extreme point of ∆µ , then F (∆µ ) is singleton and δ ∗ is the unique
solution where all coordinates are equal.
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If δ ∗ is not an extreme point then δ ∗ = λδ 0 + (1 − λ)δ 00 for some δ 0 , δ 00 ∈ F (∆µ ).
Note also that by AN, we have π(δ) ∈ F (∆µ ) for all π ∈ Π for any δ ∈ F (∆µ ). Then
F (∆µ ) is the collection of points on the Pareto frontier that lie on the hyperplane
passing through δ ∗ . In this case the solution is multi-valued.
1
1
1X
In each case F (∆µ ) maximizes the sum
δi , implying µ = ( , . . . , ).
n i
n
n

Appendix B

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

B.1 Samaritan’s Dilemma
The Biblical parable of the Good Samaritan appears in Luke 10:25-37. Traveling
from Jerusalem to Jericho, the Samaritan encounters a Jewish traveler, who was
beaten, robbed, and “left half dead” along the road. While a priest and then a
Levite pass by and refuse to lend a hand, the Samaritan helps the Jewish traveler
and his act is highly applauded as a selfless act.
The Samaritan’s Dilemma, introduced by Buchanan (1975), reflects the
characteristics of the modern welfare state and emphasizes the role of the
time-inconsistency problem. I will briefly describe the bailout game in Buchanan’s
framework by considering a simple bailout game played by the government (the
principal) and a firm (the agent).
The firm, as a nature of its business activities, faces the risk of bankruptcy.
Against this risk, the firm engages in activities related to risk management in
various levels. The degree of risk management is reduced to two levels for simplicity.
The government wants to help the firm against the risk of bankruptcy in order to
avoid the dead-weight costs, has an option to help the firm. The government’s
preferences are ranked from highest to lowest as following:
(3) The firm chooses high effort and the government helps.
(2) The firm chooses low effort and the government helps.
68
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(1) The firm chooses high effort and the government does not help.
(0) The firm chooses low effort and the government does not help.
In response, the agent’s preferences are ranked from highest to lowest as:
(3) The firm chooses low effort and the government helps.
(2) The firm chooses high effort and the government helps.
(1) The firm chooses high effort and the government does not help.
(0) The firm chooses low effort and the government does not help.

Help
Do Not Help

Low Effort
2,3
0,0

High Effort
3,2
1,1

Table 3: The bailout game and the Samaritan’s Dilemma

Given these preferences, the game is set out in normal form in Table 3, in which
the government is the row player and the firm is the column player. Checking the
payoff matrix, the firm does not have a dominant strategy. If the government does
not help, the firm’s best response is to choose high effort. If the government decides
to help, the firm is better of by choosing low effort. The government, however, has a
dominant strategy to help to the firm. Whether the firm chooses low or high effort,
the best response of the government is to help. Given that the firm is informed
about the government’s preferences, (2,3) is a Nash equilibrium in which neither
party can improve independently deciding to do something else.
Consider the following modification to the game which involves strategic
considerations on the part of the government. Suppose that the government
convincingly announces that the Low Effort-Help option is the least preferred
outcome. A credible pre-commitment to an alternative ranking of preferences by
principal is as follows:
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(3) The firm chooses low effort and the government does not help.
(2) The firm chooses high effort and the government helps.
(1) The firm chooses high effort and the government does not help.
(0) The firm chooses low effort and the government helps.
Low Effort
Help
0,3
Do Not Help
3,0

High Effort
2,2
1,1

Table 4: The modified bailout game

In the modified version of the game, as depicted in Table 4, neither the government
nor the firm has a dominant strategy. On the one hand, if the firm chooses high
effort, the government’s best response is to help, and on the other hand if the firm
chooses low effort, the government’s best response is not to help. The agent’s best
responses are the same as in the original version. But the best possible outcome
(0,3) for the firm is ranked at the bottom of the government’s preferences. The
second best option for each player coincides at (2,2) where the firm puts high effort
and the government helps. Note that this option is ranked as the best outcome in
government’s original preferences.
This solution heavily relies on the credibility of the government’s
pre-commitment to the modified ranking of preferences. If the firm believes strongly
that the government’s true preferences are as in the original version, the
government’s pre-commitment is no longer credible. The agent may simple call the
government’s bluff and chooses low effort.
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B.2 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter III
Proof of Lemma 1. From (2) the principal’s first order condition is

Wb = −π − π

∂p
c=0
∂b

(28)

and the second order condition is

Wbb = −π

∂ 2p
c < 0.
∂b2

(29)

Note that, by Assumption 3, the second order condition is satisfied. Since each
player moves only once, with one step of backward induction, we can treat b as a
function of e. Since Equation (28) is an identity, differentiating Wb (b(e), e) = 0
totally with respect to e we obtain

−π c

∂ 2p
∂ 2 p db
+
∂b2 de ∂b∂e


= 0,

that is
2

∂ p
db
∂b∂e
= − ∂2p .
de
2
∂b

By Assumption 3 the last expression is negative so we have b0 (e) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Equation (1), the agent’s first order condition is

∂p(e, b) ∂p(e, b) db
−v (e) − π
+
u(y) = 0.
∂e
∂b de
0



Let b∗ and e∗ denote the (joint) solutions to Equations (28) and (30).

(30)
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Alternatively, if the principal chose not to bail out the agent regardless of effort,
that is b∗∗ (e) ≡ 0, Equation 30 becomes

∂p(e∗ , 0)
−v (e ) − π
u(y) > 0,
∂e
0



∗

(31)

db∗∗
= 0.
de
the level of effort that satisfies the no-bailout first order

by Assumption 3(c) and since
Denoting by e∗∗

condition 31, we find e∗ < e∗∗ by Assumptions 2 and 3(c). Hence, e∗ is inefficient.
Note that by pre-committing to b̄ = b∗ , the principal is better off as well.
Proof of Theorem 3. Since effort is unobservable, the agent takes b∗ as given and
chooses e = e∗ to maximize

U (e) = u(y) − v(e) − π p(e, b∗ ) u(y).

This yields the first order condition

∂p(e∗ , b∗ )
−v (e ) − π
u(y) = 0.
∂e
0

∗



(32)

If b∗ > 0, and similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, it follows from Assumption
3(c) that the right-hand-side of Equation 32 would be positive if no bailouts were
offered. Thus, again, we find that e∗ < e∗∗ , where e∗∗ denotes the optimal level of
effort without a bailout. That is, e∗∗ is chosen to satisfy

∂p(e∗∗ , 0)
−v (e ) − π
u(y) = 0.
∂e
0

∗∗



Lastly, we want to point out that b∗ is given as the solution to
∂p(e∗ , b∗ )
−1
=
.
∂b
c
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By Assumption 3(b), the optimal bailout transfer b∗ is thus increasing in the social
cost c. Hence, b∗ > 0 for sufficiently large c.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we differentiate one
agent’s first order condition with respect to other agent’s optimal choice of effort.


∂ 2 π de1
∂ 2π
+ 2
∂e1 ∂e2 ∂ e1 de2

Solving for



∂π ∂p1 ∂ 2 p1 de1
∂p1
p1 +
+
π
+
∂e1 ∂e1 ∂e1 2 de2
∂e1




∂π de1
∂π
+
∂e1 de2 ∂e2
v 00 (e1 ) de1
=− 1
.
u(y1 ) de2

de1
we obtain
de2
de1
= − v00 (e1 )
1
de2
+
u(y1 )

∂2π
p
∂e1 ∂e2 1
∂2π
p
∂e21 1

+

∂p1 ∂π
∂e1 ∂e2
2
∂π ∂p1
+ ∂∂e1p21 π
∂e1 ∂e1

+

+

∂p1 ∂π
∂e1 ∂e1

By Assumption 4, both the numerator and denominator are positive, which
concludes the proof.

Appendix C

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV

C.1 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter IV
Proof of Lemma 3. Let b ≥ 0 be given and fixed. Since p0H (b) > p0L (b), we must have

pL (0) − pL (b) > pH (0) − pH (b).

Moreover, since pL (0) > pH (0) and pL (b) > pH (b), we get
1 − pH (b)
pH (0) − pH (b)
pL (0) − pL (b)
1 − pL (b)
=1+
<1+
=
.
1 − pH (0)
1 − pH (0)
1 − pL (0)
1 − pL (0)

Proof of Lemma 5. When ψ = (R, A), the principal’s expected welfare function is

WRA (b) = W0 − µ pH (0)c − (1 − µ) [b − pL (b) c].

Taking the first-order condition with respect to b yields the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 5. Follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. It is left to verify the condition for choosing low versus high
effort.
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Under Assumption 9, the agent’s expected utility from choosing low effort is

EUL ≡ pL (b∗ ) · 0 + [1 − pL (b∗ )] · uLL ,

and the agent’s payout from exerting high effort is

τ
EUH ≡ pH (0) · 0 + [1 − pH (0)] · uHH − vH
.

Since it is optimal to choose e = 0 if and only if EUL > EUH , we obtain Inequality
(19).
Proof of Theorem 7. Follows immediately from Theorem 6 and Proposition 4.
Proof of Theorem 8. Combine Theorem 6 and Proposition 4.
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